A Probit Model of NLRB Bargaining Order Cases in the Appellate Courts by Bethel, Terry A. & Melfi, C. A,
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1989
A Probit Model of NLRB Bargaining Order Cases
in the Appellate Courts
Terry A. Bethel
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, bethel@indiana.edu
C. A, Melfi
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bethel, Terry A. and Melfi, C. A,, "A Probit Model of NLRB Bargaining Order Cases in the Appellate Courts" (1989). Articles by
Maurer Faculty. 2463.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2463
A Probit Model of NLRB Bargaining Order 
Cases in the Appellate Courts 
C.A. MELFI  and T.A. BETHEL* 
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN  47405 
This study examines NLRB bargaining orders that have gone to appeals courts 
and ascertains what factors influence whether or not the order is enforced and to 
what degree these factors influence the likelihood of enforcement. Substantial in- 
formation has been collected from each reported appellate decision that reviewed 
NLRB bargaining orders issued over a four-year period. A probit regression 
model is employed to examine whether factors related to an employer's unfair 
labor practice campaign are involved in the circuit court's enforcement decisions 
or if more weight is given to unrelated factors, such as the circuit in which the ap- 
peal is heard or the amount of judicial delay involved in the appeals process. 
I. Introduction 
The basic policy of the National Labor Relations Act is one of majority rule: 
Unions typically acquire representational rights by convincing a majority of 
employees that such representation is in their best interests. Unions then may seek 
voluntary recognition from the employer or petition for an election conducted by 
the National Labor Relations Board. Employers frequently resist the organiza- 
tional efforts of unions, and uring the campaign period preceding the election 
the employer and the union compete for employees' upport hrough speeches, 
letters, and other forms of propaganda. If an employer's campaign practices 
threaten employees or otherwise interfere with their ability to exercise free choice, 
the NLRB usually conducts are-run election and orders the employer to stop the 
unlawful campaign practices. Sometimes, however, the NLRB determines that, 
despite its order to cease and desist, the employer has created such a coercive 
atmosphere that a subsequent election will be affected. In those instances, the 
NLRB may remedy an employer's unlawful conduct by ordering it to bargain 
with the union; this is commonly called a Gissel bargaining order. ~ The order is 
issued even though the union may have lost the election and, until recently, even 
though there was no indication that the union had support from a majority of 
*Funding for this research was supported by NSF Grant SES-86-18517. 
'The name comes from the Supreme Court's opinion in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 
(1969), in which the Court upheld the Board's authority to impose remedial bargaining orders. 
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employees.2 The NLRB's assumption is that such orders protect he rights of em- 
ployees by denying to employers the fruits of their illegal conduct and by estab- 
lishing the very relationship that the conduct sought o destroy. 
The courts of appeals review a large number of bargaining order cases. This 
finding by itself is not surprising. NLRB remedial orders are not self-executing. I f  
an employer fails or refuses to comply with an order, the Board's only recourse is 
to petition for enforcement in the appellate courts. 3Moreover, the employer in 
bargaining order cases has engaged in unusually serious unfair labor practices, 
and the Board might believe that judicial enforcement is appropriate to encour- 
age compliance. 
Similarly, "any person aggrieved" by the issuance of the Board's remedial 
order, such as the employer against whom the order operates, can petition the 
court for review.' Given the controversial nature of the bargaining order remedy 
and given that such orders typically issue only against employers who have fought 
vigorously against a union, it might be expected that these employers will use the 
review process as an additional avenue of avoiding, or at least of delaying, the 
bargaining obligation. 
This study examines bargaining orders that have gone to the appeals courts 
and will ascertain which factors influence whether or not a bargaining order is en- 
forced and to what degree these factors influence the likelihood of enforcement. 
We have collected substantial information from each reported appellate decision 
that reviewed NLRB bargaining orders issued over a four-year period. In what 
follows, we examine whether factors related to the employer's unfair labor prac- 
tice campaign are involved in the circuit court's enforcement decision or whether 
more weight is given to unrelated factors, such as the circuit in which the appeal is 
heard or the amount of judicial delay involved in the appeals process. We also 
examine whether or not factors specifically mentioned by the appeals courts in 
reaching their decisions agree with our empirical findings. 
I I .  Bargaining Orders in the Appe l la te  Courts  
Under the National Labor Relations Act, both the existence of and the remedies 
for unfair labor practices are matters entrusted primarily to the discretion of the 
NLRB. As the Supreme Court has said, "Congress could not catalogue all the 
2At issue in Gissel was the NLRB's authority to impose a bargaining order as a remedy for an mploy- 
er's serious unfair labor practices when the union had once demonstrated majority support through 
signed authorization cards. In Co air Corp., 261 NLRB 1189 (1982), enforcement denied, 721 F. 2d 
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the Board claimed authority to issue a bargaining order as a remedy for particu- 
larly egregious employer conduct, even in the absence of a showing of union majority status. Conair 
was overruled by the Board in Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 NLRB 578 (1984). For a fuller discussion of
the issues raised by these cases, see Bethel (1984). 
3See Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(e). 
'See Section 10(f) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §160(f). 
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devices and strategies for circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could it 
define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate the policies in an infinite variety 
of specific situations."5 The responsibility to both identify and redress unfair 
labor practices, therefore, was assigned to the Board "as one of those agencies 
presumably equipped or informed by experience todeal with a specialized field of 
knowledge, ''~ with its decisions being subject to only limited judicial review. 
Moreover, Supreme Court decisions make it clear that the Board's expertise isen- 
titled to considerable deference by the courts,  particularly with respect o the 
formulation of remedies. 
By statute, the courts of appeals have the power to enforce the Board's 
orders, to modify them, or to set them aside. Board findings of fact, if supported 
by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 7 Still, there have been numerous requests 
by the appellate courts that the Board devise a set of standards or guidelines con- 
trolling the issuance of bargaining orders. A review of the courts' opinions, how- 
ever, indicates that they, too, are guilty of inconsistency in their enforcement of
the Board's orders. 8
Both the circuit courts and the Board are reluctant to frustrate mployees' 
free choice by forcing an unwanted union  them. Therefore, especially if the 
union has lost a representation election, there must be sufficient evidence to indi- 
cate that the outcome of the election was a response to the employer's anti-union 
actions rather than a reflection of actual employee sentiment. 
It is difficult to categorize the type of employer misconduct that results in a 
bargaining order. Among the unfair labor practices committed by an employer 
during a union organizing campaign are "hal lmark" violations. These unfair 
labor practices are said to '  'go to the heart of the [National Labor Relations] Act"  
by reinforcing employees' awareness of their employer's control over the work- 
ers' economic destiny, thereby enabling the employer to dictate the employees' 
actions regarding union organization. These violations include discriminatory 
discharge, threat of plant closure, threat of discharge, promise of benefits, grant 
of benefits, and plant closure. 
Briefly, discriminatory discharge refers to an employer's firing or layoff of 
employees in retaliation for their support of a union. Threat of plant closure and 
threat of discharge are either overt or implied threats to close the plant or to dis- 
charge employees if union activities are not stoppped. An employer promises or 
grants benefits as incentives for employees to cease their organizational efforts. 
~Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). 
~Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). 
7See Section 10(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §160(e). 
*See Bethel and Me/fi (1988) for a thorough analysis of the opinions of appeals courts in bargaining 
order cases. 
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Examples of such benefits include wage increases, increased break time, and bet- 
ter holiday and vacation privileges. Finally, plant closure refers to an employer's 
temporary or permanent shutdown, specifically as a reaction to union organiza- 
tional efforts. Although the commission of one or more hallmark violations does 
not guarantee the issuance of a bargaining order, the absence of all such unfair 
labor practices does not preclude an order to bargain. 
Besides the hallmark violations, other factors enter into the assessment of 
the appropriateness of a bargaining order in any particular case. These factors in- 
clude the other unfair labor practices committed by the employer, 9 the number of 
employees in the bargaining unit, the strength of employee support for the union, 
and factors specific to each case pertaining to the organizational campaign 
period. The task of the NLRB is to determine whether or not an employer's actions 
are pervasive nough to prevent the conduct of a fair election, thus necessitating a 
bargaining order. Otherwise, the employer is ordered to cease his unfair labor 
practices, and a second (or first) election is ordered. 
Of  the 176 Gissel orders issued from 1979 to 1982, 108 were reviewed by the 
courts of appeals. Of  those, the court enforced the Board's order in 70.4 percent 
of the cases. When bargaining orders are reviewed, with the employer, the NLRB, 
or even both as petitioner, the appeals courts' authority is to determine if the 
Board abused its discretion by issuing the order. I f  the court determines that the 
order was justified, the bargaining order is enforced. The proportion of bargain- 
ing orders that are enforced varies over time, but the orders are enforced more 
often than not. Insight into what determines whether or not a bargaining order 
will be enforced is gained by perusing the opinions of the circuit courts for cases in 
which bargaining orders have and have not been enforced. 
One factor that might influence whether or not a bargaining order is enforced 
is the employer's unfair labor practice campaign. The presence of any of the haU- 
mark violations, except perhaps plant closure, should have a positive ffect on the 
probability of enforcement. I f  a plant closes, and the shutdown is not temporary, 
then the court of appeals might be less likely to uphold a bargaining order, 
because there would be no employer with whom to bargain.i° It is difficult to pre- 
dict which of the remaining violations would have the largest impact on the 
probability of enforcement. 
~Common unfair labor practices (besides hallmark violations) committed by e ployers include 
employee surveillance or impression fsurveillance, employee interrogation, physical violence, overly 
broad no distribution-no solicitation rules, and statements that bringing in a union would be futile. 
Any employer action that interferes with employees' rights to organize isconsidered an unfair labor 
practice. 
'°Such enforcement decisions, however, are not entirely useless. It is clear, for example, that 
employers must bargain with the unions that represent their employees ov r the effect on employees of 
the business closure. See, for example, First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 
(1981). Presumably, however, a union would have little leverage to extract concessions (such as 
severance pay) from an employer who had already ceased operations. 
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Discriminatory discharge might be perceived asproducing different effects 
in different cases. For example, it is likely that the discharge of leading union 
advocates or of a significant percentage of the bargaining unit would chill the 
organizational interest of the remaining employees. In contrast, as the court 
noted in NLRB v. Loy Food Stores, Inc. d /b /a  Ken's IGA ,11 the firing of two 
"teenage goof off" employees was thought to be "not likely to intimidate the 
adult workforce." In short, discriminatory discharges might not produce the 
same coercive ffect in all cases, or the court of appeals' assessment of the effect 
of a discriminatory discharge might differ from the NLRB's assessment. S ill, it is 
likely that the presence of one or more discriminatory discharges will add to the 
probability that a bargaining order will be enforced. 
Similarly, the grant of benefits could have differing effects on the probability 
of enforcement i  different cases. If the benefit granted was a substantial wage in- 
crease to all employees, for example, then this might be more likely to preclude a 
fair election than would either a small wage increase or the granting of a five- 
minute increase in break time. The category "grant of benefits," therefore, in- 
cludes factors that increase the probability of enforcement with differing degrees 
of impact. A parallel argument holds with respect to the promise of benefits. 
Threats of discharge and threats of closure are likely to have fairly similar ef- 
fects regardless of the characteristics of the bargaining units. The number of em- 
ployees in the unit, however, might cause such t reats to have differing effects and 
might affect he perceived severity of other unfair labor practices. The issue of unit 
size is discussed below. One additional observation is that these threats can either 
be overt or implied. Whether or not threats are implied is a judgmental decision, 
but the courts and the NLRB had little disagreement over this issue for the sample 
under consideration. Again, the presence of either of these hallmark violations i
expected to increase the probability that a bargaining order will be enforced. 
If the appellate courts are showing deference to the Board's assessment of
the effect of hallmark violations, then the presence of these violations hould 
have no effect on the probability of enforcement. Courts, however, often make 
their own assessments as to the effects of employers' unfair labor practice cam- 
paigns. That is, the courts often mention one or more of the employer's unfair 
labor practices in justifying their decision of whether or not to enforce the 
Board's bargaining order. 12 This implies that he presence of hallmark violations 
will affect he probability of enforcement of bargaining orders as discussed here. 
Another interesting influence is the passage of time between the union's de- 
mand for recognition and the court of appeals decision. Courts have sometimes 
justified a failure to enforce bargaining orders by alluding to the "changed cir- 
cumstances doctrine," which takes into account changes occurring between the 
time the Board issues its order and the time of the court's decision. When there is 
"697 F. 2d 798 (7th Cir. 1983). 
'2See Bethel and Melfi (1988). 
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significant delay, the court might also be influenced by changes that have occur- 
red in the interval between the employer's unlawful conduct and the Board's 
order. Changed circumstances include both employee turnover and the restruc- 
turing or replacement of management personnel. In many such cases, the passage 
of time itself influences the court's decision. 
Whether changed circumstances should be considered is a point on which the 
appellate courts disagree. Some courts, in enforcing bargaining orders, have spe- 
cifically mentioned that changed circumstances should not be taken into account. 
If the presence of changed circumstances is a significant factor in the non- 
enforcement of a bargaining order, then the coefficient on the variable represent- 
ing the number of months between the union's demand for recognition and the 
court's decision should be negative, indicating a dampening effect on the proba- 
bility of enforcement. If changed circumstances donot matter in the determina- 
tion of whether or not a bargaining order will be enforced, however, then the 
coefficient on the time lag would be close to zero. 13 
Although both the Board and the courts ometimes speculate about he im- 
pact of unfair labor practices on small bargaining units, it is not easy to predict 
the effect of unit size on the probability of enforcement. On the one hand, unfair 
labor practices might have a more significant impact on employees ina small bar- 
gaining unit. This consideration should increase the likelihood of enforcement i  
cases involving small bargaining units. This effect implies a negative value of the 
coefficient on unit size; that is, enforcement is more likely in cases involving small 
bargaining units. On the other hand, employee turnover during the delay between 
the demand for recognition and judicial review is expected to result in a higher 
employee r placement rate in a small unit than in a large one. High employee turn- 
over is one of the changed circumstances that might detract from the likelihood of 
enforcing a bargaining order, implying a higher probability of enforcement in 
cases involving large bargaining units. Thus, the effect of unit size on the proba- 
bility of enforcement is uncertain, a priori, and depends on which aspect of unit 
size has the stronger influence. 
With respect to bargaining order cases, Gissel requires only that he union at 
some point demonstrate majority support. This being the case, it is not clear that 
the level of employee support should affect he probability that a bargaining order 
will be enforced. There is some indication, however, that the appeals courts take 
into consideration how much above a minimum majority the employee support 
was. If this is a factor in the appellate court decisions, then the mpirical evidence 
should demonstrate that higher employee support results in a higher probability 
that a bargaining order will be enforced. 
Differing attitudes among the twelve circuits toward bargaining orders can 
be accounted for by differentiating among the circuits in which the appellate cases 
,3For examples of cases on both sides of this debate, see Bethel and Melfi (1988). 
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are decided. This would capture circuit-specific effects, such as whether or not 
any particular circuits are tougher or more lenient han others in the treatment of
bargaining orders. The coefficients on the twelve circuits cannot be hypothesized 
a priori, except hrough casual observations about the circuits, gathered from 
reading the circuit courts' opinions in bargaining order cases. Based on such evi- 
dence, the Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit appear to have much lower enforce- 
ment rates than the other circuits; no circuits appeared to be noticeably enient in 
the cases studied. Thus, negative coefficient estimates are expected on the vari- 
ables representing the Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit. 
III. Data and Model  Specification 
In order to address the questions posed above, we examined the population of all 
bargaining orders issued during fiscal years 1979 through 1982. TM Of the 176 
NLRB bargaining orders issued during that period, the appeals courts reviewed 
108. Ofthose appeals, the bargaining order wasnot enforcedin 32 ofthe cases: of 
the 76 enforced bargaining orders, 27 were enforced by memorandum decisions. 15 
For the firms and unions involved in the 108 appealed cases, the following infor- 
mation was collected: unit size (number of employees in the bargaining unit); 
NLRB region 1' in which the firm was located; the percentage of employees who 
signed authorization cards at the time that the union demanded recognition (or 
filed a petition); the time (in months) between the date of demand for recognition 
and the date the NLRB issued the bargaining order; the time (in months) between 
when the bargaining order was issued and the date of the court of appeals deci- 
sion; the circuit and the outcome of the appellate case; and any unfair labor prac- 
tices committed by the employer. 
The information  employee support, region, unit size, time between de- 
mand for recognition and bargaining order, and unfair labor practices was col- 
lected from NLRB cases. Lexis (a computer assisted legal research service) and 
the NLRB's Classified Index to Decisions were used to identify all bargaining 
order cases within the study period. The remaining information was obtained 
from the court of appeals opinions. Names, definitions of, and descriptive statis- 
tics on the variables used are included in Table 1. 
"This period runs from October 1, 1978, through September 30, 1982. Fiscal years are used rather 
than calendar years because the NLRB's records and statistics are maintained by fiscal years. 
'SA memorandum decision usually denotes an unpublished order, the results of which are merely 
noted in the Federal Reporter. Sometimes there is no official report of the court's action at all. In 
those cases, we have gathered ata either from unofficial case reports (such as the Labor Relations 
Reference Manual) or fr m NLRB records that are available to the general public. 
~6The NLRB is a federal administrative agency headquartered in Washington, DC. The Board main- 
tains more than 30 regional offices throughout the United States. These offices are under the supervision 
of the General Counsel, who acts as prosecutor inunfair labor practice cases. The primary activity of 
the regional offices is the investigation a d prosecution of unfair labor practices and the holding of 
elections in representation cases. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Data 
Sample 
Proportion Standard 
Variable or Mean Deviation Range 
ENFORCE (1 = enforced, 0 = not enforced) .70 - -  0 or 1 
UNSTRNGTH (o7o authorization cards signed) 65.53 14.13 46.0-100.0 
SIZE (# employees in bargaining unit) 76.57 123.57 2-1000 
DEM-ORD (# months between demand for rec. and 
date of bargaining ord.) 25.96 10.12 10.5-63.0 
ORD-APP (# months between bargaining ord. and 
appellate decision) 16.48 6.60 6.0-43.0 
DEM-APP (# months between demand for rec. and 
appellate decision) 42.44 12.94 23.5-92.0 
DISCHG (1 = discriminatory discharge, 0 = none) 0.59 - -  0 or 1 
THRCLS (1 =threat of plant closure, 0=none) 0.47 - -  0 or 1 
THRDIS (1 = threat of discharge, 0 = none) 0.54 - -  0 or 1 
GRNTBEN (1 = grant of benefits, 0 = none) 0.44 - -  0 or 1 
PROMBEN (1 =promise of benefits, 0=none) 0.49 - -  0 or 1 
CLOSE (1 = plant closure, 0 = none) 0.03 - -  0 or 1 
The variable, ENFORCE, represents the observation of the answer "yes" or 
"no"  to the question of whether or not each bargaining order was enforced. This 
variable is defined to equal one if the bargaining order was enforced and zero if 
not. The mean of ENFORCE, 0.70, indicates that 70 percent of the 108 bargain- 
ing orders in the sample were enforced by the courts of appeals. 
In order to test he hypothesis about he effect of unit size on the probability 
of a bargaining order being enforced, the variable, SIZE, was measured as the 
number of employees in the bargaining unit. This number often changes during 
the time between the union's demand for recognition and the court of appeals 
decision. When this was the case, the unit size at the date of the union's demand 
was used, because the union's majority status is usually measured as of the time of 
the demand. Unit size ranged from 2 to 1,000, with 76.57 employees being the 
average size. 
USTRNGTH, measured as a percentage, is used as an indication of 
employee support for the union. Because lections were not conducted in all of 
the cases examined inthe study and because the elections held were "tainted" and 
do not accurately indicate support for the union, strength of employee support is 
measured as the number of authorization cards signed by employees in the bar- 
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gaining unit (at the time of demand for recognition) divided by the total number 
of employees inthe bargaining unit (SIZE). This percentage was a majority (i.e., 
between 50 and 100) in all except one case. 17 Seven of the 108 observations on 
employee support for the union showed complete (100 percent) support. 
It is worth noting that Cooper (1984) examined the appropriateness of using 
authorization cards as a measure of the amount of employee support for a union. 
Cooper found evidence to indicate that majority employee support, as measured 
using authorization cards, does not guarantee a union victory in an NLRB- 
conducted election. This can be interpreted todemonstrate that he percentage of
authorization cards igned overstates the level of employee support for the union. 
The average l vel of support for the unions in the cases tudied is 65.53 percent. 
Interestingly, this is close to the percentage atwhich Cooper found there to be a 
50-50 chance of a union winning an election. 
The effect of a delay on the probability of enforcement was measured using 
the variables DEM-ORD, ORD-APP, and DEM-APP, which represent the num- 
ber of months (to the nearest one-half month) between the union's demand for 
recognition (or, if no demand was made, the filing of a petition) and the NLRB 
decision, between the date of the NLRB decision and the court of appeals deci- 
sion, and between the union's demand for recognition and the court of appeals 
decision. If the coefficient on any of these variables is positive and significant, 
then employers should be more eager to appeal the Board's decision in order to 
cause further delay, thus reducing the probability of enforcing the bargaining 
order.18 As can be seen in Table 1, several months or years can pass between a
union's demand for recognition and a final decision by the court of appeals. 
The variables DISCHG, THRCLS, THRDIS, PROMBEN, GRNTBEN, and 
CLOSE represent hallmark violations. They are set equal to one if the violation 
was committed and zero if not. The unfair labor practices corresponding to these 
six variables are: discriminatory discharge (or layoff), threat of plant closure, 
threat of discharge, promise of benefits, grant of benefits, and plant closure. 
With any of the hallmark violations, itseems reasonable toassume that an employ- 
er's action would tend to undermine union support, thus making it more likely 
that a bargaining order will be enforced. 
'TThe case in which a bargaining order was issued even though there was never any indication of ma- 
jority support for the union is Conair Corporation, 261 NLRB 1189 (1982). Of the 176 bargaining 
orders issued by the NLRB during the sample period, there was one other in which there was no indica- 
tion of majority support. United Dairy Farmers Cooperative, 257 NLRB 772 (1981) did not go to the 
court of appeals and is not included in our sample of 108 appealed cases. The Board overruled Conair 
and disclaimed its authority to issue non-majority bargaining orders in Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 
NLRB (1984). 
~SAs noted previously, employers still have an incentive to appeal bargaining order decisions, even if 
there is little chance that the order will be overturned. This is because such employers want to put off 
the bargaining obligation as long as possible. 
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The most frequently observed hallmark violation was discriminatory dis- 
charge, which was committed by 59 percent of the employers. This may be an 
indication that employers assume that the discharge of employees for union ac- 
tivity is an effective unfair labor practice for them to utilize.~9 Close behind dis- 
criminatory discharge is the threat of discharge, committed by 54 percent of the 
employers. The least frequently used (and arguably the most drastic) hallmark 
violation was plant closure. Only 3 out of the 108 employers closed down, 
although 47 percent (51 employers) threatened to close. Finally, nearly half of the 
employers promised benefits to the employees in order to discourage support for 
a union, and 44 percent of the employers actually granted benefits to the em- 
ployees for that purpose. 
Table 2 summarizes the appellate courts' decisions, broken down according 
to the circuits in which the appeals were heard. The average nforcement rate for 
all circuits is 70.4 percent. The enforcement rates of only two circuits - -  the Sec- 
ond and the Seventh - -  are significantly different from the average. In both cases, 
the enforcement rates of the circuits are significantly lower than the overall 
enforcement rate. Accordingly, two variables, representing the Second and 
Seventh Circuits, are included in the estimating model. The expected signs of the 
Table 2 
Summary of Appellate Court Decisions 
Number of Cases Number Enforced Number Not Enforced 
Circuit (out of 108) (out of cases in Cir) (out of cases in Cir) 
1 6 (5.6°7o) 4 (66.7%) 2 (33.3070) 
2 11 (10.2070) 5 (45.507o) 6 (54.5%) 
3 14 (13.007o) 12 (85.707o) 2 (14.307o) 
4 7 (6.507o) 4 (57.107o) 3 02.9%) 
5 3 (2.8070) 3 (100.007o) 0 (0.0070) 
6 19 (17.607o) 15 (78.9070) 4 (21.107o) 
7 8 (7.4070) 2 (25.0070) 6 (75.0070) 
8 13 (12.007o) 11 (84.6070) 2 (15.407o) 
9 15 (13.9070) 11 (73.3°70) 4 (26.707o) 
10 2 (1.907o) 2 (100.007o) 0 (0.0070) 
11 3 (2.8070) 2 (66.7070) 1 (33.3070) 
DC 7 (6.5070) 5 (71.407o) 2 (28.6070) 
Totals: 108 (100.0°70) 76 (70.407o) 32 (29.607o) 
'91n an article criticizing the NLRA representation process, Weiler (1983) referred to discriminatory 
discharge as "the most powerful weapon in the employer's arsenal" (p. 1779), adding that "the dis- 
missal of key union adherents gives a chilling edge to the warning that union representation is likely to 
be more trouble for the employees than it is worth" (p. 1778). 
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coefficients on these variables are negative, meaning that cases in the Second and 
Seventh circuits have a lower probability of being enforced than do cases in the 
other circuits, ceteris paribus. 
As previously noted, the observation on the dependent variable is simply the 
answer "yes"  or "no"  to the question of whether or not the bargaining order was 
enforced by the court of appeals. Therefore, the observed ependent variable is 
assigned a value of 1 if the order in case i was enforced and 0 if not (i = 1 . . . . .  108). 
Such a binary dependent variable suggests the binary probit model 2° and can be 
summarized as: 
ENFORCE~ = c~ + X;y=, ~jXu + e~, i = 1 . . . . .  108 (1) 
where ENFORCE is the binary dependent variable, the X's are the independent 
variables that are hypothesized to affect the probability of enforcement, e is a 
normally distributed error term, and ~ (the constant erm) and the/3's are the 
coefficients to be estimated by maximum likelihood. The specific form of equa- 
tion (1) that was estimated is: 
ENFORCE~ = c~ + t$1USTRNGTH~ + ~2DEM-APP~ + B3DISCHG~ 
+ I~4THRCLS~ + (3sTHRDIS, + B6GRNTBEN~ 
+ t~TPROMBEN, + f3sCIR2, + 139CIR7~ + e,, (2) 
where the subscript i represents case number, with i = 1 . . . . .  108. 2' 
IV. Results 
The coefficient estimates for the model presented in the previous section are 
reported in Table 3. These estimates must be interpreted carefully. They do not 
represent the effect on the probability of enforcement resulting from a one unit 
change in the corresponding independent variable as in a linear model. Rather, 
the change in the probability of enforcement resulting from a one unit change in 
an independent variable depends on the original probability of enforcement and, 
therefore, on the initial values of all the independent variables and on their esti- 
mated coefficients. More precisely, OProb(y, = l)/Ox~j = f(x'~)t3j, where f ( . )  is 
2°Alternatively, a logit model could be estimated in this framework. The difference between the binary 
probit and logit models is the assumption concerning the distribution of the random error term. The 
error term is assumed to follow a normal distribution i the probit model, whereas in the logit model, 
it is assumed to follow the extreme value distribution. Because both models are equally easy (in terms 
of computer time) to estimate, the probit model was chosen because the normal distribution for the 
error term is believed to be more realistic than the extreme value distribution implicitly assumed inthe 
logit model. 
2, The variable CLOSE, representing the hallmark violation of plant closure, was not included in the 
estimating model. There were only three cases in which this violation occurred; therefore, the variable 
CLOSE is equal to zero for 105 of the 108 observations. 
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the standard normal density function and Prob(yl = 1) ranges from zero to one? 2 
The above expression depends on the point at which f(x' [3) is evaluated. Specifi- 
cally, this expression will be higher at values of x'B that are close to the sample 
mean ofy (.704) and lower at probabilities of enforcement close to zero and one. 
Evaluations of these partial derivatives, in order to estimate the effects of chang- 
ing values of the independent variables on the probability of enforcement, are 
presented in the last column of Table 3. These expressions are evaluated at the 
sample mean values of the variables. 
Table 3 
Estimated Coefficients and Partial Derivatives 
Evaluated at Sample Means 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Partial 
Variable Coefficient Derivative 
CONSTANT - 1.6741 
(1.1115) 
USTRNGTH 0.0282** 0.0088** 
(0.0122) 
DEM-APP - 0 .0048 - 0.0015 
(0.0116) 
DISCHG 0.4949"  O. 1541 * 
(0.3098) 
THRCLS 0.8147"*  0.2537** 
(0.3165) 
THRDIS 0.0627 0.0195 
(0.3059) 
GRNTBEN 0.4943* 0 .1540"  
(0.3225) 
PROMBEN - 0 .0322 - 0 .0100 
(0.3060) 
CIR2 - 1.2248"* - 0 .3815"*  
(0.4503) 
CIR7 - 1.6192"* - 0.5043** 
(0.5980) 
*significant at 10 percent level. 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
"For  a thorough, easy to follow explanation of the interpretation of probit coefficients, see Becker 
and Waldman (1987). 
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Missing from the estimating model is the variable SIZE, measured as the num- 
ber of employees inthe bargaining unit. When this variable was included, it was 
found not to have a significant effect on the probability of enforcement. Further- 
more, the inclusion of SIZE along with the variable USTRNGTHresulted in some 
multicollinearity n the estimation. This is due to the fact that the size of the bar- 
gaining unit is inversely related to the strength of employee support for the union.2~ 
Employee support (USTRNGTH) was found to have a small, positive ffect 
on the probability that a bargaining order will be enforced. This result can be in- 
terpreted inlight of Cooper's (1984) findings concerning the relationship between 
the level of employee support and the likelihood of a union election victory. 
Cooper found evidence to indicate that majority employee support, measured the 
same way as the variable USTRNGTH, does not guarantee a union victory in an 
NLRB-conducted election. Still, Cooper found a direct relationship between the 
level of employee support and the probability of the union winning an election. In 
terms of the present study, the value of approximately .03 for the estimated coef- 
ficient on USTRNGTH indicates that at the mean levels of the explanatory vari- 
ables a 10 percent increase in employee support for the union will result in the 
probability of enforcement increasing by approximately 0.088. 
It is not entirely clear why the level of employee support should increase a
court's willingness to enforce a bargaining order. The critical inquiry is not the 
level of support (assuming it is at least a majority), but rather theeffect of the 
employer's unlawful conduct. As speculated in Section II, a court may be more 
willing to defer to the Board's assumptions about he coercive ffect of employer 
action when the union has had substantial support. That is, the court might be 
more willing to accept he Board's conclusion that a union's election loss was 
caused by coercion (rather than by a mere loss of interest) when it had previously 
garnered significant employee support. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the length of time between a union's demand for rec- 
ognition and the circuit court's decision was found to have no significant effect 
on the probability of enforcement. I  was hypothesized that changed circum- 
stances might decrease the probability of enforcement, especially because courts 
often refer to that factor in their non-enforcement decisions. The estimated coef- 
ficient on DEM-APP, however, is close to zero, and it is insignificant inexplain- 
ing the probability of enforcement. The components ofDEM-APP (DEM-ORD 
and ORD-APP) were included separately in other estimating equations, and 
neither was found to have a significant effect on the probability of enforcement. 
Despite some courts' assertions to the contrary, their failure to enforce bargaining 
orders cannot be accounted for by pointing to the changed circumstances doctrine. 
Rather, the courts appear to be using that doctrine to justify decisions actually 
reached on other grounds. 
2'Small units tend to have high employee support. The units with 100 percent support for the union 
ranged in size from 2 to 7. 
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Although the passage of time does not affect he chance of enforcement, it 
does appear to reduce a union's chances of successful negotiations with the 
employer. Even with an enforcement rate of over 70 percent, employers till 
benefit when courts review bargaining order cases. Besides simply putting off the 
bargaining obligation, evidence suggests hat he delay contributes a more signifi- 
cant effect. In some appealed cases, a substantial number of union supporters 
leave the work force before judicial enforcement. At the time of the court's order, 
then, the bargaining unit is comprised of many employees who were not working 
for the employer during the union organizing campaign. This causes ome unions 
to abandon the bargaining relationship because of a lack of employee support. 24 
The most consequential hallmark violations were discriminatory discharge, 
threat of plant closure, and grant of benefits. The effects of these unfair labor 
practices were found to be positive and significant in explaining the probability of 
enforcement. A case in which a discriminatory discharge was committed (not 
considering how many employees were discharged) is estimated to have a 0.154 
more probable chance of being enforced than a case in which no discriminatory 
discharge took place. The presence of the threat of plant closure is estimated toin- 
crease the probability of enforcement by 0.254, and the grant of benefits raises 
the probability of enforcement by an estimated 0.154, which is the same as the 
estimated effect of discriminatory discharge. 
These findings, however, do not necessarily mean that the courts defer to 
NLRB decisions concerning the effect of unfair labor practices. They may merely 
indicate that the courts agree with the Board's assumptions about theeffect of 
certain actions. This analysis is supported by noting that unfair labor practices, 
other than the three mentioned above, had no significant effect on the probability 
of enforcement. This might indicate that the courts are making their own estima- 
tion of the likely effect of an employer's conduct rather than deferring to the 
Board's assessments. Such action clearly could not be justified under the stan- 
dard of review established by the Supreme Court. 
As expected, bargaining order cases that were heard in the Second and 
Seventh circuits have significantly ower probabilities of enforcement than those 
reviewed by other circuits. Cases going to the Second Circuit are stimated to 
have a 0.382 lower probability of being enforced than do other cases. For the 
Seventh Circuit, the estimated effect on the probability of enforcement is o lower 
it by a factor of 0.504. Closer examination of the opinions written in the Second 
and Seventh circuit cases heds ome light on the reasons for these lower nforce- 
ment rates. Based on the circuit court opinions used in this study, it appears that 
24This evidence isbased on preliminary data collection for a project hat examines unions that have 
been brought about by bargaining orders and compares these unions with unions that were elected 
during the same time-period. Many of the bargaining order unions have abandoned their bargaining 
relationship with the employer, citing lack of employee support, due to substantial employee turnover 
since the employer's unfair labor practice campaign, as the reason for abandonment. 
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the Second and Seventh circuits place unrealistically high explanation require- 
ments on the Board in bargaining order cases, resulting in these circuits enforcing 
smaller proportions of bargaining orders than any of the other circuits. 
Given the reduced probability that orders heard by the Second and Seventh 
circuits will be enforced, employers located within those jurisdictions have con- 
siderable incentive to seek judicial review. This is especially true given the tendency 
of both circuits to mention delay in the assessment of an order's propriety. Con- 
versely, to the extent that forum shopping is possible, union representatives should 
make an effort o avoid having bargaining order appeals heard in the Second and 
Seventh circuits. 2~ 
V. Concluding Comments 
An examination of the factors that determine whether or not an NLRB bargain- 
ing order will be enforced by the court of appeals revealed some interesting 
results. The most significant effect on the probability of enforcement was deter- 
mined to be the circuit in which the case was heard. Both the Second and the 
Seventh circuits have much lower enforcement rates in bargaining order cases 
than do any of the other circuits. 
Other significant factors include the level of employee support for the union 
and the type of hallmark violations committed by the employer. The directions of 
the effects of each of these factors were as expected. The most significant hall- 
mark violations were found to be discriminatory discharge, threat of plant 
closure, and grant of benefits. The presence of any of these unfair labor practices 
increased the probability of enforcement by over 0.15. It was also found that the 
lengths of the judicial delays in bargaining order cases do not reduce the proba- 
bility of enforcement, despite the occasional mention of changed circumstances 
as a justification for overturning the NLRB's bargaining order decisions. 
Much empirical research still needs to be done in the area of bargaining 
orders. Other topics include the comparison of unions that were installed as a 
result of bargaining orders with those that were elected by the employees in an 
NLRB-conducted election. This topic is currently being researched and promises 
to shed more light on the controversy surrounding bargaining orders. 
2~Section 10(f) of the Act authorizes "any person aggrieved" by an NLRB unfair labor practice order 
(typically the losing party) to seek review in the circuit court of appeals "wherein the unfair labor prac- 
tice was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the 
United States Caurt of Appeals for the District of Columbia." Similarly, under Section 10(e), the 
Board can seek review either in the circuit where the unfair labor practice occurred or where the 
employer "resides or transacts business." 
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